While impressed by much of what Mercier & Sperber (M&S) offer through their argumentative hypothesis, we question whether the specific competencies entailed in each system are adequate. In particular, whether system 2 might not require independent reasoning capabilities. We explore the adequacy of the explanations offered for confirmation bias and the Wason selection task.

In this important book, Drew Khlentzos explains the antirealist argument from a realist perspective. He defends naturalistic realism against the antirealist challenge, and he considers the consequences of his defense for our understanding of realism and truth. Khlentzos argues that the naturalistic realist view that the world exists independently of the mind must take into consideration what he calls the representation problem: if the naturalistic realist view is true, how can mental representation of the world be explained?He (...) examines this major antirealist challenge in detail and shows that many realists have dismissed it because they have not understood its nature. He sees it as a philosophical puzzle: the antirealist challenge, if sound, does not prove that there are no objects that exist independently of the mind, but that there is no rational basis for thinking that there are; we have good reason to believe in the naturalistic view, but we have no way of knowing how it could be true. Khlentzos surveys the antirealist arguments of Michael Dummett, Hilary Putnam, and Crispin Wright and suggests a realist answer. He argues for a radically nonepistemic conception of truth, and against pragmatist, intuitionist, verificationist, and pluralist alternatives. He examines and rejects some current versions of physicalism and functionalism, and offers an original version of the correspondence theory of truth. (shrink)

Zusammenfassung In der sportökonomischen Literatur ist in den vergangenen Jahren eine Hinwendung zum ökonomischen Ansatz unter Verwendung der Modellannahmen des Homo Oeconomicus festzustellen. In diesem Aufsatz wird argumentiert, dass dies Ausdruck des ökonomischen Imperialismus ist, weil unter ökonomischem Imperialismus die Anwendung der ökonomischen Methode auf originär außerwirtschaftliche Lebensbereiche zu verstehen ist. Darüber hinaus wird die Auffassung vertreten, dass diese Anwendung der ökonomischen Methode im Sport in den meisten Fällen zu fruchtbaren Ergebnissen und guten Erklärungen sozialer Situationen im Sport führt. Bei (...) der Anwendung der ökonomischen Methode sind aber die Grenzen und Gefahren hinsichtlich der Rationalität und Motivation der Akteure sowie hinsichtlich des normativen Gehalts der Methode zu berücksichtigen. (shrink)

The specific mechanisms whereby Pavlovian conditioning leads to adaptive behavior need to be elaborated. There is no evidence that it is via reduction in the “destabilizing effect that time lags have on feedback control” (Domjan et al. 2000, sect. 3.3). The adaptive value of Pavlovian conditioning goes well beyond the regulation of social behavior.

Finance programs around the world have been revising their curricula following the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). While much of the debate has centred on the dominance of scientific and quantitative pedagogical approaches to finance education in business schools, one of the most egregious aspects uncovered during the deleveraging of the financial system was the scale and scope of finance crime and financial fraud (including the Madoff scandal, described as the largest Ponzi scheme in history). This paper argues that those “on (...) the inside”, the professionals within the finance industry, have a central role to play in safeguarding the ethics and integrity of financial markets. It is our conjecture that prevention and earlier detection of finance crime and financial fraud may be addressed, in part, by better educating finance professionals about these issues. We posit that the enormity of illegal activity uncovered in the wake of the GFC demands, as a matter of priority, the integration of criminological and criminal justice theory into the finance curriculum. (shrink)

Collecting the work of linguists, psychologists, neuroscientists, archaeologists, artificial intelligence researchers and philosophers this volume presents a richly varied picture of the nature and function of mental states. Starting from questions about the cognitive capacities of the early hominin homo floresiensis, the essays proceed to the role mental representations play in guiding the behaviour of simple organisms and robots, thence to the question of which features of its environment the human brain represents and the extent to which complex cognitive skills (...) such as language acquisition and comprehension are impaired when the brain lacks certain important neural structures. Other papers explore topics ranging from nativism to the presumed constancy of categorization across signed and spoken languages, from the formal representation of metaphor, actions and vague language to philosophical questions about conceptual schemes and colours. Anyone interested in mental states will find much to reward them in this fine volume. (shrink)

According to naturalism, philosophy is part of science. Its aim is thus to acquire synthetic knowledge of the world. Philosophy's methods of discovery – its use of a priori reasoning, conceptual analysis, and thought experiments – are legitimate to the extent that they further this broader scientific aim, naturalists aver. A very different view of philosophy sees it as distinct from science in both aim and methods. Philosophy aims to discover analytic knowledge through a priori reasoning on this competing view. (...) This view of philosophy emphasizes rational intuitions as a source of evidence for the truth of the conclusions attained by a priori reasoning. Naturalism has been criticized as incompatible with realism, the view that the existence and nature of the world are independent of human conceptions of it. What naturalistic sense could be made of the idea that a scientific theory that passed every conceivable observational and theoretical test might yet be false? Isn't such a notion of truth, presupposed by realism, simply at odds with the idea that science is the arbiter of truth? Further, doesn't the attempt to marry naturalism and realism open the door to a radical kind of skepticism, one that makes it impossible to know that all our experiences of the world are not illusory? This chapter explores the nature of philosophy and philosophical theorizing from the perspective of naturalistic realism, arguing that naturalism and realism are compatible in spite of attempts to show they are not. The chapter reviews the leading arguments for incompatibility – Hilary Putnam's model‐theoretic argument (MTA) and the brains‐in‐a‐vat argument – and finds that they do not establish this conclusion. Further, it shows that the view that philosophy is distinct in aim and methods from science – a view that places its faith in the evidential warrant supplied by rational intuition – is at odds with what cognitive science has shown about the nature and reliability of these sorts of intuition. (shrink)

SummaryAnti‐Realism claims that the Classical or Realist conception of truth as verification‐transcendent is incoherent. Our grasp of the meanings of statements from any given class is to be assimilated to a grasp of their assertibility or deniability conditions. In this paper I present an apparent counter‐example to the Anti‐Realist's positive claim which derives from the traditional problem of other minds.ResumeL'anti‐réalisme affirme ľincohérence de la conception réaliste classique de la vérité comme transcendante à la vérification. Notre saisie des significations des énoncés (...) ? une classe donnáe quelconque doit être assimilée à la saisie des conditions dans lesquelles ils peuvent être affirmés ou niés. Dans cet article, je présente un apparent contre‐exemple, tiré du problème traditionnel de l'existence ? autres sujets, à la thèse positive des anti‐réalistes.ZusammenfassungDer Antirealist behauptet, dass die klassische realistische Auffassung der Wahrheit als einer der Prüfung unzugänglichen Begriffes unhaltbar sei. Um die Bedeutungen irgendwelcher Aussagen verstehen zu können, mussen wir die Bedingungen ihrer Behauptbarkeit kennen. Ich lege ein offenbares Gegenbeispiel zur These des Antirealisten vor, das sich aus dem traditionellen Problem des Fremdbewusstseins ergibt. (shrink)

This paper argues that the Correspondence Theory of Truth is not well- served by Truthmaker Theory and is better developed in a different direction. For there are reasons to believe that the main axiom of that theory (TA) which states that for every truth there is a truthmaker is either unjustified or false. Some of these reasons are already well-known. Negative existentials and universal generalizations present initial difficulties for TM theory as do necessary truths. There is a more serious problem, (...) though which has not hitherto been noticed. (TA) even when restricted to contingent sentences seems to tolerate clear counterexamples. There seem to be, and I argue that there in fact are, true contingent sentences which lack truthmakers. The examples adduced are all truthmaker analogues of semantically pathological sentences. The positive proposal shares with Truthmaker Theory the view that our judgments and sentences are rendered true by the worldly facts but argues for an alternative conception of Ôrendering trueÕ and a novel conception of 'facts'. (shrink)

We present a series of arguments for logical nativism, focusing mainly on the meaning of disjunction in human languages. We propose that all human languages are logical in the sense that the meaning of linguistic expressions corresponding to disjunction (e.g. English or , Chinese huozhe, Japanese ka ) conform to the meaning of the logical operator in classical logic, inclusive- or . It is highly implausible, we argue, that children acquire the (logical) meaning of disjunction by observing how adults use (...) disjunction. Findings from studies of child language acquisition and from cross-linguistic research invite the conclusion that children do not learn to be logical—it comes naturally to them. (shrink)

Crop genetic resources constitute a ‘new’ global commons, characterized by multiple layers of activities of farmers, genebanks, public and private research and development organizations, and regulatory agencies operating from local to global levels. This paper presents sui generis biocultural community protocols that were developed by four communities in Benin and Madagascar to improve their ability to contribute to, and benefit from, the crop commons. The communities were motivated in part by the fact that their national governments’ had recently ratified the (...) Plant Treaty and the Nagoya Protocol, which make commitments to promoting the rights of indigenous peoples, local communities and farmers, without being prescriptive as to how Contracting Parties should implement those commitments. The communities identified the protocols as useful means to advance their interests and/or rights under both the Plant Treaty and the Nagoya Protocol to be recognized as managers of local socio-ecological systems, to access genetic resources from outside the communities, and to control others’ access to resources managed by the community. (shrink)

In an age characterised by an increasing integration of advanced technology into our everyday lives, posthumanism has developed into a major intellectual force. It affects research agendas, economic developments, social policies, philosophical theories, and ultimately the way we understand ourselves. This handbook provides a comprehensive overview of the various aspects of posthumanism and how they are represented, discussed and exemplified in the cultural medium of film and television. Understood broadly as any critical engagement with the possibility that the human condition (...) is no longer a given, that it is more fluid than we once thought, and that we are, or will soon be, free to remould our constitutive framework and value systems, posthumanism is the next step in critical engagement in the humanities. It reflects upon the malleability of the human condition and acknowledges the fact that we are no longer the beings we thought we were, and that perhaps we never were. (shrink)

The main question that Firestone & Scholl (F&S) pose is whether “what and how we see is functionally independent from what and how we think, know, desire, act, and so forth” (sect. 2, para. 1). We synthesize a collection of concerns from an interdisciplinary set of coauthors regarding F&S's assumptions and appeals to intuition, resulting in their treatment of visual perception as context-free.

Western philosophy’s relationship with prisons stretches from Plato’s own incarceration to the modern era of mass incarceration. Philosophy Imprisoned: The Love of Wisdom in the Age of Mass Incarceration draws together a broad range of philosophical thinkers, from both inside and outside prison walls, in the United States and beyond, who draw on a variety of critical perspectives (including phenomenology, deconstruction, and feminist theory) and historical and contemporary figures in philosophy (including Kant, Hegel, Foucault, and Angela Davis) to think about (...) prisons in this new historical era. All of these contributors have experiences within prison walls: some are or have been incarcerated, some have taught or are teaching in prisons, and all have been students of both philosophy and the carceral system. The powerful testimonials and theoretical arguments are appropriate reading not only for philosophers and prison theorists generally, but also for prison reformers and abolitionists. (shrink)

In reply to Michael Campbell, I reformulate my questions of Raimond Gaita, avoiding the expression “form of life”. I examine what might remove the need for my questions, before taking up Campbell's line of thought about what he calls the “inwardness” of moral concepts. Campbell helps to clarify the picture of moral concepts advanced by Wittgensteinian moral philosophers. But at a general level, the picture remains unclear where a grammar meets its scaffolding of facts. Some may find this unproblematic, (...) and indeed unavoidable. But I remain unsure of this, and hope to provide at least a useful caution. (shrink)

In lectures and writings in the decades following the publication of Studies in Ethnomethodology [1967], Harold Garfinkel, the founder of ethnomethodology, developed what he called a “misreading” of the phenomenological writings of Aron Gurwitsch, Maurice Merleau-Ponty and others. Garfinkel’s “misreading” included a selective and creative treatment of themes that Gurwitsch drew from Gestalt psychology, such as figure-ground, Gestalt contexture, and the phenomenal field. Rather than identifying these themes with visual perception demonstrated with picture-puzzles (for example, of animals hidden in (...) foliage) and line drawings of reversible figures, Garfinkel used them to demonstrate praxeological and interactional phenomena: organizations of embodied activity that constitute fields of collective action. Phenomenal fields, for Garfinkel, are formed through embodied work performed in concert with the actions of others. Although Harvey Sacks, the founder of Conversation Analysis, did not explicitly mention Gurwitsch, phenomenology or Gestalt psychology in his writings and transcribed lectures, some of his writings on the sequential organization of conversation seem informed, if only indirectly through his relationship with Garfinkel, by Gurwitsch’s treatment of visual and auditory phenomena. Both Garfinkel and Sacks devised innovative ways to transpose Gestalt phenomena from perceptual psychology to social formations. (shrink)

In this essay, I set out my responses. to the following five questions that had been posed: -/- 1. What initially drew you to theorizing about science and religion? 2. Do you think science and religion are compatible when it comes to understanding cosmology (the origin of the universe), biology (the origin of life and of the human species), ethics, and/or the human mind (minds, brains, souls, and free will) 3. Some theorists maintain that science and religion occupy non-overlapping (...) magisteria—i.e., that science and religion each have a legitimate magisterium, or domain of teaching authority, and these two domains do not overlap. Do you agree? 4. What do you consider to be your own most important contribution(s) to theorizing about science and religion? 5. What are the most important open questions, problems, or challenges confronting the relationship between science and religion, and what are the prospects for progress? My responses to four of the questions were quite brief, with about three-quarters of what I said devoted to the second question, where I talked about cosmology, biology, psychology and the human mind, and ethics, and where I argued that in all of those areas there are very serious incompatibilities between science and/or philosophy on the one hand and Christianity on the other. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:A Response to My ReadersMichael S. Hogue (bio)I. IntroductionI often begin writing for personal reasons: to slow my thinking, clarify and organize my thoughts, trace ideas, and sort concepts. Generally, a concern for something I consider wrong about the world motivates me to write. Provoked by such a concern, I write to understand why and how what is wrong came to be that way and why and how I (...) think it can or should be different. I write in reply to H. Richard Niebuhr's moral hermeneutic question, "What's going on?" And yet, while writing typically begins (for me) as a personal search for understanding, this search eventually leads me to (re) discover my formative communities of inquiry and interpretation. None of my questions or ideas, none of my orienting values, none of my interpretive impulses are mine alone. They do not, and cannot, exist independently of others' questions, ideas, values, and interpretations. To use Peirce's metaphor, they are slender fibers braided into a larger cable rather than independent links in a chain. The issues and questions that motivate my research; the topics I care about enough to develop into articles and books; the conceptual, critical, and normative vocabularies I bring to my research and writing; the intellectual traditions that shape the patterns of my thinking—none of these are strictly personal or individual. They have taken root and grown in me as I've learned with and from others. Writing reminds me that, as a person, I am a creature of relational processes because it shows me that my mind is not (exclusively) my own—what and how I think have been formed, animated, and limited by my experience with others in a larger world of experience that is broader and deeper than any individual mind.I open this brief essay with this comment to acknowledge my gratitude and indebtedness not only to the authors of the articles in this special issue (Walter Gulick, Robert Smid, John Teehan, and AJ Turner) but also to the larger community of scholars that comprise the readership of the American Journal of Theology and Philosophy (AJTP) and the Institute for American Religious and Philosophical Thought (IARPT). I attended my first IARPT (HIARPT, at the time) conference about seventeen years ago, soon after completing my Ph.D. I didn't know anyone personally then, but I knew several folks as authors of articles and books I had read in recent years. I discovered IARPT through the bibliography of Victor Anderson's book, Pragmatic Theology: Negotiating [End Page 80] the Intersections of an American Philosophy of Religion and Public Theology. I resonated with Anderson's articulation of a socially engaged public theology that drew from American pragmatist, historicist, and naturalist philosophies of religion. His mind had been where mine was going, into the dissenting tradition of American immanence, or the left wing of American radical theology, as I refer to it.While reading Anderson's book, I learned that many of the authors in his bibliography met every summer as a (relatively?) organized group of like-minded scholars. I joined them the next chance I had. And as things go with this group, I was immediately recruited to serve as the book review editor for the AJTP! Since that first meeting, I've attended as many IARPT meetings as my schedule allows, organized one of the summer conferences, served as AJTP book review editor for several years, and then served for several more years as the AJTP editor (following Michael Raposa's illustrious term!). Most recently, I was honored when Andrew Irvine and Austin Roberts made American Immanence a focus of the 2021 IARPT conference, "Political Thought and the Powers of Democracy: American Thought in the Anthropocene." Gulick's, Smid's, Teehan's, and Turner's articles began as papers for that conference.All this is to say what I have heard many others say through the years: the IARPT/AJTP community of interpretation has become a primary intellectual (and even spiritual) home for me. I am (and we are) fortunate to belong to a group of academic philosophers and theologians who collectively embody a rare (let us hope not... (shrink)

Carol Gilligan's In a Different Voice, which appeared in 1982, argued that men tend to conceive morality in terms of rights, justice, and autonomy, whereas women more frequently think in terms of caring, responsibility, and interrelation with others. At about the same time, Nel Noddings in Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education sought to articulate and defend in its own right a “feminine” morality centered specifically around the ideal of caring. Since then, there has been a heated (...) debate about the reality of the distinction Gilligan drew and about its potential implications for ethical theory. Discussions of the morality of caring have questioned, in particular, whether any such morality can really provide a total framework for moral thought and action. For in order to deal with our obligations to people we are not acquainted with and address large-scale issues of social morality, any morality of caring seems to require supplementation by typically “masculine” thinking in terms of rights and justice, with the result that caring turns out to be but one part of morality, rather than anything women, or more enlightened men, could find attractive as a total and self-sufficient way of approaching ethical issues. (shrink)

“Mechanical objectivity,” which Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison trace to the mid-nineteenth century, often coincided with efforts to inscribe nature “directly,” such as through automatic registering machines. But what did this inscription entail? Addressing this question requires that we reexamine indexicalization: the shift in semiotic ideology whereby medial technologies are imagined and acted on as if they preserved material traces of the real. Indexicalization is no simple reflex of mechanical objectivity and is more varied and consequential than commonly imagined. This (...) essay demonstrates this by returning to the sciences of face-to-face interaction, which crystallized in postwar America but drew inspiration from earlier research on talk therapy. Returning to efforts to record psychoanalysis sessions in the early 1930s “objectively,” it chronicles a shift in the technosemiotic mediation of knowledge. Whereas transcripts were originally “verbatim” records of literal content, researchers came to seek tacit, symptomological signs. And whereas mechanical recording was introduced to avoid an observer effect, it was later deemed necessary to preserve indexical traces for fine-grained analysis. This indexicalization had ontological as well as epistemological effects, and it was inspired not by mechanical objectivity but by the parallel capacities of the perceptive psychoanalyst and the receptive mechanical recorder, both virtuosic in registering the indexical richness of the communicative unconscious. (shrink)

This study uses evidence from the press and from the parliamentary record to examine the extent to which, and the ways in which, people involved in the public debate over laboratory experiments on human embryos in Britain during the 1980s drew on images from science fiction. It is shown that negative images from science fiction were used in the debate, but that these images could be transformed into resources for defending, as well as attacking, this form of scientific endeavor. (...) It is also shown that other fictional structures were present in the debate and that both sides relied heavily on fictional components to justify their competing appraisals of embryo research. (shrink)

The work of Ernesto Laclau (both with and without his occasional collaborator, Chantal Mouffe) has exerted considerable influence in rhetorical studies over the past two decades. Emerging alongside the so-called epistemic and cultural turns, the project of "critical rhetoric" and cognate endeavors have found in Laclau a revision of Gramsci's hegemony thesis that places discursive—and thus, evidently, rhetorical—operations at the center of politics, culture, and social processes generally. While Raymie McKerrow's seminal essay (1989) drew on Laclau and Mouffe to (...) outline a set of tasks for rhetoric that clearly remained within the ambit of ideology critique, subsequent appropriations of what is variously called .. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:738 BOOK REVIEWS tical ruin, for what is required is a proper legal response to their illegal acts and a properly political response to their political acts. Burtchaell is usually close to the truth in his ethical judgments, hut one is often uneasy with these judgments either because of some glaring inconsistencies or because they do not seem grounded on a solid theoretical basis. He is possessed of some (...) remarkably clear insights and a powerful rhetorical style, hut these suffer from his inability to string these insights into a consistent outlook on these critical biomedical issues. University of Illinois Champaign-Urbana, Illinois ROBERT BARRY, O.P. Image and Spirit in Sacred and Secular Art. By JANE DILLENBERGER. New York: Crossroad, 1990. Pp. 217. $29.95. In the quarter century since the close of Vatican II, it is surprising how few Catholic seminaries in this country have followed the Council mandate that called for the study of sacred art by candidates preparing for ordination. On the contrary, the preconciliar ambivalence toward the arts in general, and the visual arts in particular, has been superseded by an incipient iconoclasm that has flourished hand in hand with the liturgical renewal. In the exuberance of throwing out the vestiges of preconciliar culture, hasty reformers have unwittingly embraced new art forms that are all too often lacking in aesthetic or spiritual value. Their untrained eyes predictably gravitate toward the insipid, the garish, and the gaudy. Much of what has been lauded as Catholic art in the past two decades finds itself as hopelessly outdated as the burlap banner. Catholic culture has devolved into Catholic kitsch. It is ironic that the most eloquent voice for the study of art in American seminaries today belongs not to any priest or prelate, hut to a Protestant woman, Jane Dillenherger, who has established a long and distinguished career teaching in theological seminaries. These include: Drew Theological Seminary, San Francisco Theological Seminary, the Pacific School of Religion, and the Jesuit School of Theology in Berkeley. The Harvard-educated Dillenherger is the author of numerous hooks and articles dealing with art and religion. That she foresaw a career dedicated to rebuilding bridges between these two long-estranged fields of study was evidenced early on when she sought an inter-disciplinary doctoral degree with a dissertation committee that would include the theologian Paul Tillich alongside the eminent art historian Erwin Panofsky. The innovative proposal was denied. Undaunted, Dillen· BOOK REVIEWS 739 berger later went on to establish at the Graduate Theological Union in Berkeley a doctoral program of studies in the Arts and Religion, the only one of its kind in the United States, where theologians, artists, and art historians collaborate in the education of future church leaders. Jane Dillenberger's latest book, Image and Spirit in Sacred and Secular Art, is fitting testimony to a career that has stretched over five decades. The hook is a compendium of essays and lectures addressed to "the inquiring, intelligent adult who has little or no formal background in the visual arts." The offerings include such diverse subjects as "The Image of Evil in Nineteenth- and Twentieth-Century Art" (what would have been her dissertation topic under Tillich and Panof· sky), "Picasso's Transformations of Sacred Art," "The Appearance and Disappearance of God in Western Art,"" Lucas Cranach, Reformation Picture-Maker," and "Images of Women in American Art." Al· together, ten essays have been included in this Crossroad publication which is generously filled with 133 reproductions of works discussed in the text. The overarching theme of this hook is to look at visual images and analyze how they have changed through successive cultural eras. In doing so the author makes every attempt to connect art and religion with everyday life. In her introductory essay, "Looking for Style and Content in Christian Art," Dillenberger calls on all viewers to discard their private prejudices as they gaze upon artworks: "Nothing less than a kind of self-abdication is demanded of us by a great work of art. It asks us to see it, if only for a few moments, in terms of the vision that it represents and expresses." Only by placing biases in check can the... (shrink)

The viability of Schelling’s Philosophy of Identity depends on the maintenance and cultivation of a reciprocal relationship between internal and objective reality. To stay on course Schelling assiduously checked the conceptual answers he derived from subjective thought against the objective measurements of contemporary physics. As the physicists of his day came to question the materiality of light, Schelling conceptualized it as the outer limit of what the intelligence is capable of grasping intuitively. At the same time he criticized Hegel for (...) ignoring knowledge altogether and for propagating a philosophy of ignorance. More than a century later Jacques Derrida recognized this characteristic in Hegel, but drew a contrary conclusion. Where Schelling counseled that rational philosophy should alter course and set sail toward a higher empiricism, Derrida insisted that in pushing rationality beyond its limits Hegel had sprung a trap of incomprehension andindeterminacy from which no one would or could henceforward escape.This essay evaluates the competing claims of Schelling and Derrida in light of the revolutionary advances of twentieth-century physics. Is this work indeed bringing forth a new world the mind qua mind cannot conceive or measure and liberating man from a prior constraint, or are the emerging physical directives of four dimensional space-time and a flat universe themselves possible only within the cloture de la representation where Derrida presumes to detain human kind indefinitely? (shrink)

Much research about organic foods standards and certification in the United States employs a critical political economic perspective to interrogate links between certification politics and the “conventionalization” of organic agriculture. While helpful, this literature tends towards a dualistic framework, which emphasizes conflicts between movement-oriented and agribusiness wings of the organic community but obscures deliberative processes that sustain the organic market as an alternative economic space. This article develops a different approach by taking up E. Melanie DuPuis and Sean Gillon’s invitation (...) to “begin a conversation about the everyday forms of civic engagement” involved in the governance of the organic foods market and other alternative economies (DuPuis and Gillon in Agric Hum Values 26:43, 2009). I merge DuPuis and Gillon’s analysis of civic “modes of governance” in the organic sector with a theory of deliberative discourse developed by the cultural sociologist Jeffrey Alexander. I then apply this approach to examine a 2017 dispute about whether hydroponic growing operations were eligible for certification under the National Organic Program rules. The data indicate that (1) several features of this dispute did not follow the lines of movement/agribusiness conflict emphasized by political economic research and (2) both supporters and opponents of hydroponic certification drew from a common discursive repertoire to advocate for their preferred outcomes. I argue that while this common repertoire does not prevent conflict over the organic standards, it does sustain the importance of civic—as opposed to purely economic or technical—considerations in the sector’s governance. (shrink)

Between 1949 and 1961 (or, arguably, 1966), three interconnected dimensions of Foucault’s early thought emerged. First, the young Foucault offered a Hegelian perspective on Kant’s notion of the transcendental. The a priori conditions of thought, Foucault suggested, both shape and arise from historical experience. Second, Foucault drew on Heidegger’s study of Kant to argue that modern thought rests on the premise of human finitude and embraces a problematic epistemology rooted in philosophical anthropology. Foucault argued that anthropology enabled a vast (...) extension of the scope of possible knowledge predicated on the falsely modest pretense that human understanding is inherently limited, even as it embraced a diminished conception of human existence. Third, Foucault developed a pointed critique of contemporary psychology and psychiatry, maintaining that they fallaciously seek to acquire positive knowledge of human beings, despite the fact the latter are inherently defined by what Foucault called “negativity.” This three-pronged interpretation of the young Foucault allows us to better situate Foucault’s work in intellectual history, to clarify his key arguments, and to grasp the articulation of his youthful and his mature thought. (shrink)

From the back cover: This book offers a collection of papers on focal themes in truth research, including minimalism, pragmatism and pluralism, and philosophical logic. It further provides valuable hindsight with contemporary perspectives on the works of Frege, Wittgenstein, Ramsey, Strawson, and Evans on truth, and it features recent discussions on the role and value of truth in politics and political discourse. The collection is based on groundbreaking presentations hosted by the Virtual International Consortium for Truth Research (VICTR), including talks (...) given at the TRUTH 20/20 conference. -/- The volume features exclusive transcriptions of panel discussions on truth and factuality with Huw Price, Douglas Edwards, Cheryl Misak, and Amie Thomasson, and on truth and polarization with Michael Lynch, Maria Baghramian, and Cailin O’Connor. It includes the transcript of a televised 1973 conversation between Peter Strawson and Gareth Evans. And the volume features new contributions from established and early career researchers in the field. Anyone interested in the nature and value of truth will find this volume to be indispensable. (shrink)

William Harvey's famous quantitative argument fromDe motu cordis about the circulation of blood explained how a small amount of blood could recirculate and nourish the entire body, upending the Galenic conception of the blood's motion. This paper argues that the quantitative argument drew on the calculative and rhetorical skills of merchants, including Harvey's own brothers. Modern translations ofDe motu cordisobscure the language of accountancy that Harvey himself used. Like a merchant accounting for credits and debits, intake and output, goods (...) and moneys, Harvey treated venous and arterial blood as essentially commensurate, quantifiable and fungible. For Harvey, the circulation of blood was an arithmetical necessity. The development of Harvey's circulatory model followed shifts in the epistemic value of mercantile forms of knowledge, including accounting and arithmetic, also drawing on an Aristotelian language of reciprocity and balance that Harvey shared with mercantile advisers to the royal court. This paper places Harvey's calculations in a previously underappreciated context of economic crisis, whose debates focused largely on questions of circulation. (shrink)

This paper explores the significant – albeit little-known – impact that physicist Albert Einstein's theory of relativity had on the development of the science of linguistics. Both Max Talmey, a physician who played a key role in the development of early twentieth-century constructed-language movements, and Benjamin Lee Whorf, who is closely associated with the notion of ‘linguistic relativity’, drew on their understanding of relativity to develop their ideas (and, in Talmey's case, also on his personal relationship with Einstein). Linguistic (...) relativity, which posits that humans’ linguistic categories shape their perceptions of nature, has often been tied to ‘relativism’ in the social sciences and humanities. In contrast, Talmey's commitment to reformulating the language of Einsteinian relativity – especially through a constructed language he built in the 1920s and 1930s – emphasized the significance of ‘invariance’ simultaneously in the scientific doctrine and in the language in which it was discussed. The semiotic flexibility of Einstein's ‘relativity theory’ as it was widely (and wildly) appropriated outside the small community of theoretical physicists enabled the two opposing moves, while obscuring the historical linkage between physics and linguistics for both. (shrink)

In al-Sirr al-Maktūm, a magisterial work on astral magic, the twelfth century Persian philosopher-theologian Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī formulated one of the most sophisticated theories of talismanic action at a distance ever produced in the Islamic world. Al-Rāzī deployed Avicennan psychology to explain how a practitioner’s soul might connect with the celestial spheres, the principles of sublunary change, and ‘blend’ their forces into a talismanic metal idol; then, performing a ritual mimetic of his intended effect, could direct these forces to bring (...) about his objective, from a distance, altering sublunary phenomena in accordance with his will. In constructing this theory, Rāzī drew on the psychologizing Avicennan accounts of thaumaturgy and veridical dreams, foregrounding what was common to both: the internal sense known as the wahm. (shrink)

This article traces some of the transformation that the fields of folk psychology and anthropology underwent in the late nineteenth century. Ludwik Fleck, in developing his sociology of knowledge, drew on both of these fields; a legacy that makes it possible to conceive of his epistemology as a theory of communication. Fleck, in grounding his understanding of the relationship between sociality and communication on insights from these two disciplines, proposed the morphological concept of an organic formation of all scientific (...) knowledge. Naturalising knowledge production in this manner, Fleck postulated a program of deciphering, reading, and translation that would relate all forms of knowledge back to the rules and conditions of its making. In this morphological conception of the processes of knowledge production, Fleck’s sociology bears significant similarities with the description of social institutions by French sociologists Marcel Mauss and Emile Durkheim, who also drew on insights from late-nineteenth-century folk psychology and anthropology. (shrink)

Whilst the ‘local culture’ of experimental natural philosophy in seventeenth-century England drew on ‘resources’ supplied by the gentlemanly identity of men like Robert Boyle, this culture found much of its distinctiveness in a series of exclusions having to do with faith, gender and class. My concern in this essay is less with these exclusions, and the distinctions they enabled, than with their surreptitious returns. Following from this, as a heuristic strategy, I will try to understand how Boyle and Co. (...) used and reacted to, repressed and cathected, that which they sought to exclude. By charting the movements of exile and return across the contested frontiers of class, gender and faith, truth and lies, authenticity and performance, we can, I believe, fruitfully complicate our understandings of both the social history of truth, and the social history of our ‘post-truth’ predicament. (shrink)

The section on the Argument from Design in collections of readings in the philosophy of religion usually begins with an expository selection drawn from Archdeacon William Paley’s Natural Theology, and follows with a critical selection drawn from David Hume’s Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. Only from the footnotes does the student learn that Hume’s Dialogues was published over twenty years before Paley’s Natural Theology. Probably the student will feel that Hume’s devastating critique of the Argument must strike every reasonable person with (...) equal force, and so he will conclude that Paley must have been an archetypal intellectual conservative—a man whose ideas were dead and fossilized long before he put pen to paper. In fact, historically, the very opposite was the case. Although few could deny Hume’s towering intellect—“God’s greatest gift to the infidel” one fellow Scot grudgingly called him—Hume failed entirely to break the hold that the Argument from Design had on people’s imaginations. As many of us feel about Descartes’s arguments from illusion, people “knew” that somehow there must be a flaw in Hume’s argumentation, for, in the words of the anatomist Richard Owen, organic characters like the hand, the foot, and the eye, bear “irrefragable evidence of creative foresight.” Far from being outdated before it appeared, Paley’s book, in which he drew lucidly upon the most recent findings in natural science, rapidly became the standard work on the Argument from Design. It was, for instance, considered essential reading in any young man’s university education. (shrink)

For the authors' responses to comments similar to those expressed here by Balsam & Drew, please see: M. Domjan, B. Cusato, & R. Villarreal (2000). Extensions, elaborations, and explanations of the role of evolution and learning in the control of social behavior. BBS 23(2):269–82. [Authors' Response to first round of commentary.].

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:An Introduction to Hegel’s Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion: The Issue of Religious Content in the Enlightenment and Romanticism by Jon StewartMichael RohlfAn Introduction to Hegel’s Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion: The Issue of Religious Content in the Enlightenment and Romanticism. By Jon Stewart. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022. Pp. xi + 304. $100.00 (hardcover). ISBN: 978-0-19-284293-0.The interpretation of Hegel’s philosophy of religion is notoriously controversial (...) for several reasons. One such reason, indicated by Jon Stewart at the outset of his new introduction to the subject, is that while Hegel’s views on religion are intricately interwoven with the rest of his philosophical system, the political climate in Prussia at the time was such that “Hegel was guarded with respect to issues of religion and took some care to dissemble his true views” (2). A second reason is that although the texts Hegel published during his lifetime contain scattered discussions of religion, his only systematic treatment of religion occurs in his Berlin Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion (LPR), which were published after his death in several editions, each of which drew upon different selections from student lecture notes and [End Page 688] Hegel’s own notes (he lectured on the philosophy of religion or proofs of God’s existence in five different semesters between 1821 and 1831), and each of which has been criticized for presenting only a partial picture of Hegel’s views on the subject. Stewart explains that the first edition of these lectures in particular, published in 1832 as part of the first complete edition of Hegel’s works, “was in many ways the key text that caused the split among... the schools of right and left Hegelianism” (15). Critics complained that this edition made Hegel look more orthodox than he actually was (16), but so-called right Hegelians defended Hegel’s philosophy as in fact consistent with orthodox Christian doctrines, while left Hegelians argued that Hegel’s philosophy “undermined or demystified Christianity” (202).Stewart’s book is an accessible and admirably neutral introduction to the philosophical context, content, and reception of Hegel’s LPR. Its scope and Stewart’s pellucid prose make it an excellent overview for readers coming to this material for the first time, while its detailed discussions of the publication history and reception of Hegel’s LPR and its thorough references make the book a valuable resource for more advanced students and scholars as well. Stewart’s approach is to frame Hegel’s philosophy of religion as a response to criticisms of religion in the Enlightenment and to Romanticism in Hegel’s own day. Accordingly, the book’s first two chapters provide context by discussing Enlightenment debates about religion in Voltaire, Reimarus, Lessing, Hume, and Kant, along with Hegel’s critical response to the Enlightenment. Chapter 3 then presents Rousseau as a forerunner, and Jacobi and Schleiermacher as representatives, of the Romantic approach to religion in Hegel’s own day. After discussing Hegel’s general method in LPR and the relation between philosophy and religion in chapter 4, Stewart turns to Hegel’s philosophical accounts of pre-Christian religions in chapter 5, of Christianity in chapter 6, and of Islam in chapter 7. Since Hegel’s account in LPR ends before the rise of Islam, Stewart draws primarily on Hegel’s Lectures on the Philosophy of History in chapter 7. Chapter 8 is, in this reviewer’s opinion, the most valuable part of the book, where Stewart summarizes and weighs in on debates in the 1830s and 1840s about the consistency or inconsistency of Hegel’s views with Christian doctrines of immortality, the personhood of God, and the divinity of Christ. The book then closes with a final chapter about the relevance of Hegel’s philosophy of religion today.Stewart indicates two distinctive features of his interpretation in the book’s introduction, where he references the tendency of scholars to assume that Hegel “kept secret his true views about religion” (13). On Stewart’s reading, there are really two related secrets concealed within Hegel’s texts about religion. First, while Hegel is quite explicit that “his... (shrink)

In _On The Soul_ (425a-b), Aristotle drew a distinction between those qualities that are perceptible only via a single sense and those that are perceptible by more than one. The latter qualities he called.

Economist Frank Knight drew a distinction between decisions under risk and decisions under uncertainty. Despite the significance of this distinction for decision theory, we argue that there has been inadequate attention to the difficulties involved in classifying decision situations into these categories. Using the risk assessment of carbon nanotubes as an example, we show that it is often unclear whether there is adequate information to classify a decision situation as being under risk as opposed to uncertainty. We conclude by (...) providing two suggestions for responding to these difficulties: treating decisions as real-world experiments; and promoting broadly based deliberation about quantitative information. (shrink)

24 undergraduates were blindfolded and walked through paths laid out on a floor to investigate whether the orientation of Ss' cognitive maps (CMs) could be determined after they had learned a path by walking through it. Given the assumption that the CM is picturelike, it was predicted that it has a specific orientation, which implies that tests in which the CM is assumed to be aligned with the path should be less difficult than tests in which the CM is hypothesized (...) to be contraligned. In Exp I (8 Ss), Ss were required to draw a picture of the path they had walked through; in Exp II (14 Ss), Ss were required to locate targets in the path under conditions in which their presumed CMs were either aligned or contraligned with the path. Results show that, in Exp I, all Ss drew the 1st line segment of the path upward, suggesting that this part of the path was fixed in an upward direction in memory. In Exp II, Ss were more accurate and faster in locating points on the path when the CM was hypothesized to be aligned with the path than when it was hypothesized to be contraligned. (shrink)

Precision, lucidity, richness of insight, and critical, objective judgment are, I think, some of the essential features of good philosophical thought. This book exemplifies, to a good extent, these features. In it the author tries to achieve two main goals: first, to distinguish what still “lives” in Croce’s philosophy “from what may be advantageously discarded, that is, the idealistic implications that he drew from his tenet that historical knowledge is self-knowledge.” Here Moss argues that “Croce’s idealist epistemological assumptions along (...) with the coherence theory of truth that he derived from them, are not viable. Nevertheless his categorical conception of error provides a genuine contribution to contemporary philosophical thought.” Second, “Croce’s view that philosophy amounted to methodology and that the philosopher’s task was to delineate “categories of the real” is indeed consistent with the historical nature of reality.”. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Pierre Bayle developed an expansive theory of toleration in his Commentaire philosophique by arguing that tolerance is a universal principle of natural law. However, by situating toleration in natural law rather than positive law, Bayle was brought into theoretical conflict with the Old Testament injunction that the state should punish idolatry. To resolve this conflict, Bayle drew upon the work of early modern Hebraists, particularly the Catholic biblical scholar Richard Simon. Bayle adapted Simon’s idea that theocracy uniquely shaped (...) the institutions of ancient Israel to argue that prohibitions against idolatry should be exclusive to the Hebrew republic. Bayle argued that the Mosaic Law did not punish someone for their sincerely held religious beliefs but only prohibited treason, and these circumstantial laws should not be emulated by other states. This allowed Bayle to contend for the moral veracity of the Old Testament and the notion that toleration is an unconditional principle of natural law. Bayle’s use of Simon displayed the revolutionary potential of textual critical scholarship in the early modern period, as he adapted Simon’s critical ideas to his own aims of promoting religious toleration within the ecclesiastical and civic spheres of his own confessional context. (shrink)